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NOTABLE STUDENT WORK
Accelerated FDA Approval of
Investigational New Drugs: Hope for
Seriously Ill Patients
I. Introduction
In recent years, seriously ill or dying patients have found it in-
creasingly difficult to obtain new drugs. Many would attribute this
difficulty to the Kefauver-Harris amendments that Congress adopted
in October, 1962.1 Although designed to provide greater protection
to the American public by requiring proof of both safety and effi-
cacy, the 1962 amendments have created an unacceptably large in-
crease in approval time, a decrease in incentive for drug innovation,
and a barrier to the acquisition of necessary drugs for seriously ill
patients. Although defenders of the current system call the drug ap-
proval system "scientifically rigorous," some critics contend that it is
"scientifically rigid, unable to react to the prolonged suffering it im-
poses." 2 In response to the furor that has raged over the so-called
"drug lag," the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has promul-
gated new regulations to expedite the new drug approval process.'
This paper focuses on the evolution of the approval process, from the
1. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 355 (Supp. 11 1982)). For an excellent discussion of this topic, see AIDS Drugs:
Where Are They?, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); AIDS, Education, Care, and Drug Develop-
ment: Hearing Before the Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989).
2. A Flawed Drug System, L.A. Daily J., Nov. 27, 1986, at 4, col. 1.
3. Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations;
Treatment Use and Sale Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,465 (1987) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §
312) [hereinafter 1987 Regulations]; Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological
Drug Product Regulations; Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-Threatening and
Debilitating Illnesses, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,515 (1988) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 312, 314) [here-
inafter 1988 Regulations].
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Kefauver-Harris amendments to the recently enacted Investigational
New Drug (IND) regulations, taking into account the costs and ben-
efits of accelerated approval.
II. Drug Approval Under the 1962 Amendments
A. The Kefauver-Harris Amendments
Before the passage of the Kefauver-Harris amendments in 1962,
each time a new drug was introduced in the market, the FDA had to
approve the new drug application." Unless the FDA rejected the new
drug within 180 days for failure to be safe for its suggested use, the
drug was considered approved.' In 1959, Senator Estes Kefauver ini-
tiated Congressional hearings to consider whether the current regu-
lation permitted drugs of questionable efficacy to be marketed to an
unwary public.6 Kefauver's proposal to enact a stricter regulation
providing for proof-of-efficacy was met with something less than en-
thusiasm. The thalidomide tragedy of 1961, 7 however, created a pub-
lic outcry for greater protection from potentially hazardous drugs.
Although the Kefauver-Harris amendments did not provide for
greater safety but only efficacy, Congress nonetheless enacted the
amendments as a response to public pressure.'
4. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 52-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988)); Peltzman, The Benefits and Costs of New
Drug Regulation, in REGULATING NEW DRUGS 114 (R. Landau ed. 1973).
5. Peltzman, supra note 4, at 114.
6. Roberts & Bodenheimer, The Drug Amendments of 1962: The Anatomy of a Regu-
latory Failure, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 581, 584.
7. Thalidomide is a nonbarbituate hypnotic drug discovered in Germany in 1954. After
preliminary animal experiments and clinical trials were completed, the West German pharma-
ceutical company Chemie Grunenthal began marketing the drug in November of 1956 to treat
respiratory infections. In October of 1957 the company began wide-spread marketing of the
drug as a sedative under the trade name Contergan. The drug was also used to treat minor
ailments such as colds, coughs, and influenza. The drug companies distributing thalidomide
advertised the drug as completely safe for use by pregnant women, although none of the com-
panies had performed clinical tests on pregnant animals.
In 1959, users of thalidomide reported side effects such as disturbed balance, constipation,
hangover, loss of memory, and toxic polyneuritis; however, the companies continued to market
the drug as safe and effective, claiming that the side effects were a result of overdosage and
overuse. In 1960, Richardson-Merrell, Inc. applied for a permit to market the drug in the
United States, but the FDA denied the request. Finally, the companies marketing thalidomide
in Europe withdrew the drug from the market on November 27, 1961, after severe fetal de-
formity was shown to be a side effect of the drug. Pregnant mothers who ingested the drug
gave birth to babies with phocomelia (flipper limbs), microtia (abnormal smallness of the ear),
and ectromilia (absence of limbs, or parts of limbs). It is estimated that thalidomide caused
birth defects in over 10,000 children. H. TEFF & C. MUNRO, THALIDOMIDE: THE LEGAL AF-
TERMATH xi-5 (1976).
8. Tests for safety involve the evaluation of the toxic effects of the drug, the manner in
which the body distributes and degrades the drug, and the side effects of the varying doses of
the drug. AIDS Treatment, Research & Approval: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
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The amendments protect the public from fraudulent drugs, but
the addition of efficacy requirements have added a major stumbling
block for the approval of beneficial new drugs. Drug manufacturers
must provide "substantial evidence" of efficacy based on "adequate
and well-controlled investigations" before the drug can be approved.'
Critics of this standard believe that it is too subjective. Words such
as "substantial" and "adequate" are open to varying
interpretations.10
With the passage of the Kefauver-Harris amendments, the FDA
began to take a more active role in the new drug approval process.
No longer allowing the forces of the marketplace to control the in-
troduction of new drugs, the 1962 amendments ushered in an era of
"centralized regulatory authority."'"
B. The Drug Approval Process
The drug development process generally begins with animal
testing. 12 If a drug appears promising, the manufacturer tests the
safety and efficacy of the drug in animals for approximately two
years.13 If the drug passes these tests, the manufacturer files an in-
vestigational new drug application with the FDA, which then re-
views all the available data."' When the FDA gives its approval to
continue testing, the manufacturer begins three phases of human
testing.'
5
During Phase I, the drug is administered to ten to fifty patients
to test how well the patients tolerate, metabolize, and excrete the
Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1988) [hereinafter AIDS Treat-
ment]. Efficacy involves the evaluation of the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indica-
tion. Id.
9. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(e) (Supp. 11 1982).
10. Oversight-The Food and Drug Administration's Process for Approving New
Drugs: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of the House
Comm. on Science and Technology, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 76 (1979) (statement of William
Wardell) [hereinafter Oversight]. Other additions to the drug approval process instituted by
the 1962 amendments include Investigational New Drug (IND) requirements and the repeal
of automatic approval within 60 days. H. GRABOWSKI & J. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF
PHARMACEUTICALS: BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND RISKS 4 (1983). An IND must include
information adequate to demonstrate that it is safe to test the drug on human subjects, and
further must include information regarding drug composition, manufacturing and control data,
results of animal testing, training and experience of the investigators, and a plan for clinical
investigation. AIDS Treatment, supra note 8, at 70.
11. H. GRABOWSKI & J. VERNON, supra note 10, at 4.
12. Id. at 22.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. ld. Although these phases are not statutory requirements, they constitute the normal
process of drug development. See generally 1988 Regulations, supra note 3, at 41,518.
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drug." The primary focus of this phase is safety." If the drug ap-
pears to be safe for human use, Phase II begins."8 During this phase,
fifty to two hundred patients take part in controlled trials, one-half
of them generally receiving placebos. 9 At this point, the drug is
evaluated from a "therapeutic and marketing standpoint."2 If the
safety and efficacy results of Phase II testing are encouraging, the
manufacturer moves to Phase III, and uses over two hundred pa-
tients to confirm and expand the results of the first two phases."
After the manufacturer collects sufficient data on the safety and
efficacy of the drug, the data is submitted in a New Drug Approval
application (NDA) to the FDA for its review.2 The FDA has 180
days to either approve or disapprove the NDA, but may extend the
period to gather further data if the NDA is incomplete. 23 The drug
will only be approved if the sponsor of the NDA shows by "substan-
tial evidence" that the drug is safe and effective for the conditions
prescribed or suggested on the labeling .2 A drug manufacturer may
choose to engage in post-marketing surveillance, sometimes called
Phase IV, although this phase is not required to obtain drug
approval. 5
The period of the approval process, from the synthesis of the
New Chemical Entity (NCE) to the eventual approval of the drug,
is approximately nine to thirteen years.20 According to Dr. William
Wardell, a well-known critic of the slow drug approval process, aver-
age approval time in 1964 was six and one-half years and had
16. 1988 Regulations, supra note 3, at 41, 518.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The second phase concentrates on both safety and efficacy. 1988 Regulation,
supra note 3, at 41,518.
20. H. GRABOWSKI & J. VERNON, supra note 10, at 22.
21. Id. According to Frank E. Young, Commissioner of the FDA, after Phase I, only
70% of the IND's survive. Of that 70%, only 33% survive Phase Ii. Of the remaining IND's,
only 27% survive Phase Ill. The reasons for failure include not only lack of safety and effi-
cacy, but also lack of commercial interest. AIDS Issues: Pending AIDS Legislation: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 278 (1988) [hereinafter AIDS Issues].
22. AIDS Treatment, supra note 8, at 71.
23. H. GRABOWSKI & J. VERNON, supra note 10, at 23.
24. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(e) (Supp. 11 1982); The Food and Drug Administration's Pro-
cess for Approving New Drugs: Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 17 (1980) [hereinafter FDA's Process].
25. 1988 Regulations. supra note 3, at 41,518.
26. H. GRABOWSKI & J. VERNON, supra note 10, at 22; Commission on the Federal
Drug Approval Process: Final Report Prepared by Subcomm. on Natural Resources, Agricul-
tural Research and Environment and Subcomm. on Investigation and Oversight on Science
and Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982) [hereinafter Commission].
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doubled by 1980.217 A significant amount of time is involved in the
approval process, and arguably too much time.
III. The Role of the FDA
Recently, the FDA has been criticized for its overly cautious
approach in approving new drugs. The process has become increas-
ingly lengthy, expensive, and complex. As a result, there has been a
rapid decline in the number of new drugs that have been introduced
into the market.2 8 Patients in desperate need of therapeutic drugs
are unable to obtain them for long periods of time. According to the
Commission on the Federal Drug Approval Process (Commission),
"Regulatory demands and delays within the U.S. drug review system
are significant factors" in this delay. 9
The Commission has suggested a decrease in regulatory burdens
in order to make new drugs that are identifiable therapeutic ad-
vances more readily available to the public.30 In order to understand
the Commission's proposal, some background on the effects of the
1962 amendments on drug approval is necessary, as is an explana-
tion of the costs and benefits of facilitating the drug approval
process.
A. The Drug Lag
During the 1970s, drug manufacturers showed increasing dissat-
isfaction with the procedure the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) used in approving new drugs. Although at first the FDA de-
nied the existence of a "drug lag,"3' it soon became clear that the
United States greatly lagged behind European countries in the ap-
proval of NCE's. New drugs are generally available in the European
market either exclusively or much earlier, or for a wider range of
27. Commission, supra note 26, at 18 (statement of William Wardell).
28. Id. at 1.
29. Commission, supra note 26, at 18.
30. With the advent of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), the demand for
these new drugs has increased, and the FDA has attempted to meet these demands. AIDS
Treatment, supra note 8, at 66. In response to the growing AIDS epidemic, Congress enacted
the AIDS Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, 102 Stat. 3062-3111 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Among other things, the Act expedites the award
of research grants and the approval of IND's for AIDS. While this effort to ease restrictions
on the use of investigational new drugs for AIDS patients is laudable, it must be remembered
that AIDS patients comprise only a segment of the group of individuals who are victims of
serious or life-threatening illnesses. The concerns of these individuals also need to be
addressed.
31. Commission, supra note 26, at 21. "Drug lag" is a term used by critics of the FDA
drug approval process to connote the delay between the discovery of a drug and the ultimate
approval and marketing of that drug.
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conditions. 2
An example of the slow approval time in the United States is
the case of the drug Sodium Valproate. s First approved in France in
1967, Sodium Valproate was approved and received phenomenal ac-
ceptance in at least forty countries before the FDA approved it in
1978.1" Although other nations consider this drug to be the greatest
advance in the treatment of epilepsy in forty years, the FDA classi-
fies it as a modest therapeutic gain. 35 According to Dr. Richard
Masland, a more rapid approval of Sodium Valproate would have
prevented one million seizures per year and would have saved over
$100,000,000 per year in decreased disability payments and in-
creased earning capacity.31 Several explanations have been offered as
to why the United States lags behind other countries in its approval
process.
1. The Kefauver-Harris Amendments.-Increased regulation
since the passage of the 1962 amendments has been the focal point
of blame concerning the drug lag. According to Dr. Wardell, "The
greatest cause of delay ... is the demand of additional proof of
efficacy long after scientists would be satisfied that a drug is effective
by the data generated."' 37 Drug manufacturers must go through a
lengthy process in order. to acquire the requisite "substantial evi-
dence" of efficacy. These requirements delay FDA approval by at
least two to four years.38 Further, the establishment of regulatory
controls over clinical testing has added a significant amount of time
to the approval process.
Most important, however, is the increase in public and congres-
sional attention that accompanied the passage of the 1962 amend-
ments. As a result of close scrutiny, the FDA has developed a ten-
dency to restrict the introduction of new drugs. It might be helpful
32. Oversight, supra note 10, at 57 (statement of William Wardell). For example, the
following drugs for cardiovascular disease were approved in Europe long before they were
approved in the United States: propanolol (Inderal), metoprolol (Lopressor), prazosin hydro-
chloride (Minipress), Minoxidil (Loniten), Ethacrymic Acid (Edecrin), Furosemide (Lasix),
and Disopyramide (Norpace). Drugs for neurological diseases (e.g. Depakene, Tegretol, Clo-
nopin), for respiratory diseases (e.g. Bricanyl), for gastrointestinal diseases (e.g. Tagamet),
and for a variety of other diseases were available abroad from months to years before they
were obtainable in the United States. Id. at 36-52.




36. Id. at 43.
37. Oversight, supra note 10, at 56.
38. Roberts & Bodenheimer, supra note 6, at 589.
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to examine this effect in terms of a "standard statistical decision-
making framework."8 9
In deciding to approve a drug, the FDA may make two types of
correct decisions and two types of errors.40 The correct decisions are
to accept drugs that are safe and effective and to reject drugs that
are not. The errors are to reject safe and effective drugs (Type 1
error) or to accept drugs that are not (Type 2 error)."' If an FDA
official commits a Type 1 error, drug manufacturers and patients
will bear the costs of being unable to procure approval of effective
drugs. 2 The rejection of effective drugs will bring little or no com-
ment from a Congressional oversight committee and the media.4
However, if a Type 2 error is committed, the FDA, and specifically
the approving official, will bear heavy costs.44 Not only will lawsuits
ensue and the marketplace destabilize, but, more important, the
FDA will fall into disrepute.'5 The agency will be subject to public
criticism, and will have to answer to the oversight committee." As
former FDA Commissioner Alexander Schmidt described the
problem:
[I]n all of FDA's history, I am unable to find a single instance
where a congressional committee investigated the disapproval of
a new drug. But, the times when hearings have been held to
criticize our approval of new drugs have-been so frequent that
we aren't able to count them. The message to the FDA staff
could not be clearer. Whenever a controversy over a new drug is
resolved by its approval, the Agency and the individuals involved
will likely be investigated. Whenever such a drug is disapproved,
no inquiry will be made. The Congressional pressure for our
negative action on new drug applications is, therefore, intense.'
7
The major effect of FDA regulation is not to bar altogether the
introduction of new drugs to the market, but to delay considerably
that introduction in order to avoid criticism. This delay may increase
the probability of the effectiveness and safety of new drugs, but it
also prevents ill patients from obtaining new therapeutic drugs.
39. H. GRABOWSKI & J. VERNON, supra note 10, at 9.
40. Id. at 10.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. With the exception of, perhaps, new drugs for AIDS or cancer.
44. H. GRABOWSKI & J. VERNON, supra note 10, at 10. The thalidomide tragedy is a
good example of a Type 2 error. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Grabowski, The Impact of Regulation on Innovation, 34 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J.
555, 558 (1979).
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2. The "Knowledge or Research Depletion" Hypothesis.-An
alternate explanation of decreasing innovation and increasing un-
availability of new drugs is that major. drug innovations occur in cy-
cles and that we are currently on a research plateau."8 A further
proposition states that the supply of basic biomedical knowledge has
been exhausted, and thus no new therapeutic advances can be
made."' No empirical proof exists for this hypothesis, but it is a con-
venient explanation of the drug lag for those who wish to maintain
the status quo.50
3. The Regulatory Failure Hypothesis.-In addition to in-
creased regulation, the method in which the FDA operates has been
cause for concern.5 The following are operating procedures of the
Agency which lead to increased approval time:
1. The FDA's attitude is adversarial to sponsors, which is in
stark contrast to the more cooperative attitudes shared by the
government and industries in technologically advanced countries
in Europe.52
2. Internal management problems include:
53
a) Slow communications with drug
manufacturers.
54
b) Scientific and professional disagreements be-
tween the FDA and manufacturers which are not read-
ily resolved and are costly and time consuming. 5
c) Poor management of human resources.5
d) Inefficient use of computerized information
systems.57
3. The FDA requires additional testing when foreign data is
used, which means that research is duplicated.58 Because of the
time lag between foreign and domestic approval, the FDA often
has been accused of using European postmarketing experience
as a test for approval.59
4. The FDA requires a defined research plan -for clinical
48. Oversight, supra note 10, at 73.
49. H. GRABOWSKI & J. VERNON, supra note 10, at 35.
50. Id.





56. Id. at 61.
57. Id. at 62.
58. S. FREDMAN, FORBIDDEN CURES 207 (1976); Roberts & Bodenheimer, supra note 6,
at 590.
59. FDA's Process, supra note 24, at 33.
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testing, but the nature of clinical research entails shifts in the
direction of plans.6" Because every change needs to be approved,
considerable delay is common.
The above explanations are not mutually exclusive, but all contribute
to the growing drug lag in the United States. Most of the blame,
however, has fallen on the 1962 amendments. Although it is now
settled that there is a drug lag, there is much debate as to its
solution.
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Experts who are in favor of a shorter approval period argue that
the faster approval process in Europe is not a result of lower stan-
dards.61 According to Dr. Lewis Engman, President of the Pharma-
ceutical Manufacturer's Association (PMA), there is no evidence
that the shorter approval times of other countries have resulted in
health hazards.62 To the contrary, the lengthy approval period in the
United States for important new drugs fails to provide identifiable
safety benefits and deprives the public of therapeutic drugs. 63 Al-
though the goal of drug regulation is to protect public health and
safety, the public is not well served if it is denied access to useful
medication.6 Although some benefits of conservative regulation do
exist, the costs of delay clearly outweigh them.
1. Costs of Delay.-The costs of delay in the introduction of
new drugs may be measured in terms of both human suffering and
economics. As mentioned earlier, the delay in marketing Sodium
Valproate resulted in one million unnecessary epileptic seizures and
a loss of over $100,000,000 in disability benefits and lost wages for
every year marketing was delayed.66 Another example of the cost of
delay involves a drug called Oculinum,66 which was invented approx-
imately ten years ago by Dr. Alan Scott. Oculinum purported to al-
leviate the symptoms of a debilitating disease called blepharospasm,
which consists of severe constant muscular spasms which contort the
face and lead to functional blindness. 67 In November of 1986 ap-
60. Id. at 54.
61. Id. at 31-32.
62. Id. at 32 (statement of Lewis Engman).
63. Id. at 31.
64. Commission, supra note 26, at 1.
65. See supra note 21.
66. A Flawed Drug System, supra note 2, at 4, col. I.
67. Id.
1045
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proval of Oculinum was not forthcoming, leaving the victims of
blepharospasm with no remedy for their disease.68
Perhaps the most costly delays involve drugs for victims of life-
threatening diseases such as cancer and AIDS. To deprive these pa-
tients of new drugs when alternative treatments do not exist clearly
presents an ethical problem. Patients may sometimes obtain treat-
ment or compassionate use of investigational new drugs. Approval
for use, however, is both expensive and time consuming. In addition,
the patient must meet stringent qualifications.6 9 For example, in
1985, the FDA approved isoprinosine for compassionate use for
AIDS victims. The cost of complying with the regulations exceeded
$2000 per patient, precluding the manufacturer from making the
drug available.70 It is worth noting that a year's supply of isopri-
nosine can be bought from the same manufacturer's subsidiary in
Mexico for $300.71 Furthermore, in January of 1987, only a few
hundred of the estimated 28,000 AIDS victims had been accepted in
FDA-approved studies, most of which utilized placebos. 72 Emphasiz-
ing the need for an expedient drug approval process for AIDS pa-
tients, one writer noted, "At present mortality rates, a two month
regulatory delay in the development of an effective AIDS cure could
cost 1,000 lives."'73 As a result of the unavailability of drugs, many
patients and physicians are forced to smuggle in the drugs from for-
eign countries or to obtain them from the black market.74
A further cost of delay is the adverse effect on drug innova-
tion. 75 The average cost of introducing a new drug has skyrocketed
and the long gestation period has shortened the effective patent life
of new drugs. 76 Due to increased regulation, "key personnel" must
concentrate on freeing the NDA from delays rather than applying
their talents to the discovery of new drugs.77 As a result of these
roadblocks, the incentive to produce NCE's is rapidly declining.
2. Benefits of Delay.-The benefits of the delay of drug ap-
proval are obvious: If a manufacturer does not release a new drug to
68. Id.
69. Gieringer, Twice Wrong on AIDS: FDA Frustrates Victims, L.A. Daily J., Jan. 15,
1987, at 4, col. 3.
70. Id. at col. 4.
71. Id.
72. Id. at col. 3.
73. Id. at col. 4.
74. A Flawed Drug System, supra note 2, at 4, col. 2.
75. See generally Grabowski, supra note 47.
76. Oversight, supra note 10, at 74.
77. Id. at 336 (statement of W. Clarke Wescoe).
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the public until extensive testing can be completed, the United
States may experience a "death lag."78 In other words, the United
States may observe the postmarketing experience of foreign coun-
tries and avoid deaths in this country by refusing to approve drugs
that caused serious side effects in foreign countries. One example is
the thalidomide incident. By delaying the introduction of
thalidomide in the U.S. and by observing the drug's effect in Europe,
the FDA prevented the tragedy from occurring in the United
States. 9 In addition, delaying the introduction of new drugs gives
manufacturers additional time to test adverse drug interactions, and
permits physicians to become better acquainted with drugs already
on the market.80
3. Cost-benefit Analysis.-While the American public has
benefited from the delay of the introduction of some drugs, the costs
far outweigh' the benefits. In minimizing the risk of approval of dan-
gerous drugs, the FDA is precluding the development and approval
of beneficial drugs. Although the FDA is attempting to create a
"risk-free" drug approval process, the "basic tenet to pharmacology
is that to every drug there is a risk."'8 In weighing the benefits
against the risks, several critics of the slow drug approval process
have noted that the occurrence of side effects, even serious ones, are
acceptable when the drug may help a large number of people.
For example, Dr. William Wardell estimates that the drug
practolol, if approved in the United States, might cause approxi-
mately 1,240 cases of visual impairment and intestinal disorders
every year. 82 On the other hand, the drug could prevent 10,000 to
20,000 deaths from secondary myocardial infarction every year.83 In
comparing the number of lives saved to the number of adverse reac-
tions of practolol, the benefits of the drug far outweigh its dangers.
As Dr. William Regelson stated, "The loss of countless lives cannot
be justified by the argument that a few people's lives are at risk."'8
The FDA believes that delaying the introduction of drugs into the
market will reduce risks to the public. In reality, however, it is
merely shifting the risk to those patients who could have been helped
by the forbidden drugs.
78. Roberts & Bodenheimer, supra note 6, at 600.
79. See supra note 7.
80. Id.
81. Oversight, supra note 10, at 335 (statement of W. Clarke Wescoe).
82. Roberts & Bodenheimer, supra note 6, at 601.
83. FDA's Process, supra note 24, at 32.
84. Id. at 36.
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After extensive consideration of the above cost-benefit analysis,
in 1983, the FDA proposed procedures to make investigational new
drugs available to seriously ill patients before general marketing.85
The proposals were neglected for several years until it was an-
nounced that the FDA was reproposing the regulations.81
IV. Expediting the Drug Approval Process
In 1987, the FDA reproposed a measure to "ease restrictions on
the use and sale of experimental drugs."87 During Congressional
hearings on the reproposal, Dr. Frank E. Young, Commissioner of
the FDA, urged Congress to "be flexible [and] recognize that we
need new measures in desperate times. We simply cannot be content
with business as usual when there is a need to treat desperately ill
people."188 Although the reproposal was intended to expedite ap-
proval, it has not succeeded in meeting the FDA's goals. Conse-
quently, in October of 1988, the FDA supplemented the reproposal
with new regulations intended to bolster the new drug approval
process. 9
A. The Reproposal of 1987
On March 19, 1987, the FDA issued regulations for drug ap-
proval procedures that were "intended to facilitate the availability of
promising new drugs to patients as early in the drug development
process as possible." 90 According to Dr. Regelson, there are two
types of patients who require medical care: those with self-limited or
curative problems where treatment is directed toward comfort and
shortening of the illness; and those with severe, permanent, debilitat-
ing or lethal diseases. 9' The new regulations apply to the latter group
of patients.
The FDA bifurcated the category of illness that includes pa-
tients with severe, permanent, debilitating, or lethal diseases into
"immediately life-threatening" diseases-which would include, for
example, AIDS and certain uncontrollable cardiac arrhyth-
85. Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations;
Treatment Use and Sale, 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.7(d), 312.34 (1990).
86. 1988 Regulations, supra note 3, at 41,516.
87. FDA Proposals to Ease Restrictions on the Use and Sale of Experimental Drugs:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1987) [hereinafter FDA Proposals].
88. Id.
89. 1987 Regulations. supra note 3.
90. Id. at 19,466.
91. Oversight, supra note 10, at 252.
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mias-and "serious" or "severely debilitating" diseases-which
would include Alzheimer's disease and multiple sclerosis. 92 In order
to obtain treatment under these regulations, the patient must have
no "comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or other therapy"
available.93 The new regulations also provide for the sale of investi-
gational new drug products.9" By allowing the sale of these drugs
under specific conditions, the FDA has recognized the necessity of
providing incentives to drug manufacturers to develop NCE's.
More significant, however, is the FDA's recognition of the bene-
fits of speedy approval for seriously ill patients. According to the
Surgeon General, by 1991 at least 179,000 Americans will have died
from AIDS.9 In response to this life-threatening disease, the FDA
approved the immune booster zidovudine (formerly called AZT) in
record time." Generally, the drug approval process lasts a minimum
of seven years, but for zidovudine the process from clinical trial to
approval took only twenty-two months.9 7 By foregoing Phase III of
the drug approval process, the FDA was able to approve the drug in
just 107 days.98 On March 19, 1987, the day the FDA approved
zidovudine, the FDA published the regulations to codify the approval
process.99
1. Treatment Use of an Investigational New Drug.-Section
312.34 of the new regulations °" permits a more liberal use of IND's
than has heretofore been allowed. The section allows patients who
are suffering from life-threatening or other serious diseases to use a
drug that is not approved for general marketing provided that no
92. 1987 Regulations, supra note 3, at 19,467.
93. Id. at 19,468.
94. Id. at 19,467.
95. FDA Proposals, supra note 87, at 78.
96. AIDS Issues, supra note 21, at 278.
97. Id. at 78, 113. The FDA has made efforts to expedite AIDS drug approvals. A
special classification, "I-AA," has been established for all AIDS drugs in order to give these
drugs the highest priority in the drug approval process. AIDS Issues, supra note 21, at 278.
Zidovudine, an inhibitor of the in vitro replication of the AIDS virus, was the first drug re-
viewed and approved under the new classification. Id. at 284, 305. As of February 1, 1988, of
179 applications for approval to test 120 new AIDS drugs, 154 applications were approved for
human testing. Id. at 285.
Additionally, on February 16, 1988, the FDA announced approval of a treatment IND for
the experimental drug trimetrexate to treat Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia, a potentially
life-threatening lung infection found in 80% of all AIDS patients at some time during the
course of the disease. Id. at 311, 316. The approval of the treatment IND means that hun-
dreds of AIDS patients will have access to the drug. Id. at 311.
98. FDA Proposals, supra note 87, at 78, 113.
99. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34.
100. 1988 Regulations, supra note 3.
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effective alternative drug or therapy is available. 101 Under this regu-
lation, life-threatening is defined as a disease in which there is a rea-
sonable likelihood that death will occur in a few months.0 3
The availability of drugs for treatment use varies depending
upon the category of disease. For serious diseases, treatment use of
drugs may begin only after Phase II investigations, which test effi-
cacy and safety of the drugs.'03 For life-threatening diseases, how-
ever, use of a new drug may begin during Phase II.10 By allowing
the use of a new drug before all testing for efficacy and safety is
complete, the FDA recognizes that for some individuals, any drug
that offers hope is better than no drug at all. As one AIDS patient
said, "I know what the side effects of untreated AIDS are. Based on
past experience, I'll be dead in two years. What's the harm in giving
me some hope?."' 10 5
In order to obtain an investigational new drug for treatment
purposes under a treatment protocol or treatment IND, four criteria
must be satisfied:
(1) The drug is intended to treat a serious or immediately
life-threatening disease;
(2) There is no satisfactory alternative drug or other ther-
apy available to treat the disease;
(3) The drug is under investigation in a controlled clinical
trial under an effective IND, or the trials have been completed;
(4) The sponsor of the controlled clinical trial is pursuing
marketing approval of the investigational drug with due
diligence."0 6
In addition, there must be sufficient evidence of the safety and effec-
tiveness of the drug if it will be used to treat serious diseases.'0 An
application for use of a drug to treat a life-threatening disease may
be denied if clinical data shows no therapeutic benefit or if the
drug's benefits are outweighed by unreasonable risk of further illness
or injury. 0 8 These safeguards and the requirements of informed con-
sent, quality control, and due diligence on the part of drug manufac-
turers in pursuing marketing approval, are designed to protect the
101. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34.
102. 1987 Regulations, supra note 3, at 19,476.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Gieringer, supra note 69, at 4, col. 3.
106. 1987 Regulations, supra note 3, at 19,476.
107. Id. at 19,477.
108. Id.
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public from fraudulent and dangerous drugs. 10 9 Though it is not
aimed at facilitating availability of drugs for persons with curative
diseases, section 312.34 benefits patients with serious and life-threat-
ening diseases by expediting the approval process for treatment
purposes.
2. Sale of Investigational New Drugs.-The 1987 regulations
provide for the sale of IND's in a clinical trial when such sale will
allow the sponsor to undertake or continue clinical trials, but only
upon prior written approval from one of several authorities."' Be-
cause the supply of a test drug is normally a part of the cost of
researching and developing the drug, special circumstances must be
shown in order to request a sale."'
In addition to special sales of IND's, the FDA permits the sale
of investigational drugs for treatment use in clinical trials under the
following conditions:
(1) The enrollment in the ongoing clinical trials is
adequate;
(2) The sale does not constitute commercial marketing of a
new drug for which a marketing application has not been
approved;
(3) The drug is not being commercially promoted or
advertised;
(4) The sponsor of the drug is actively pursuing clinical
studies and marketing approval with due diligence."'
The FDA must be notified of the proposed sale, which becomes au-
thorized following thirty days of the FDA's receipt of the applica-
tion, unless otherwise notified." 3 The FDA retains the power to
withdraw authorization of the sale if the price charged is fundamen-
tally unfair." 4 This safeguard prevents sponsors from taking advan-
tage of the more liberal rule, which sponsors might do by engaging
in commercial marketing or by extorting money from seriously ill
patients who are willing to pay anything for a cure." 5
By permitting the sale of IND's prior to marketing approval,
the FDA addresses a problem like the one faced by Dr. Alan Scott,
109. Id.
110. Id. at 19,476.
111. 1987 Regulations, supra note 3, at 19,476.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Cf. id. at 19,467.
115. Id.
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inventor of Oculinum." 6 Dr. Scott was unable to find a manufac-
turer for his product, so he manufactured it himself. The FDA, how-
ever, would not permit him to sell the drug to cover his expenses. As
a result, Dr. Scott was forced to stop making Oculinum. The new
regulations obviate such problems by allowing manufacturers to sell
IND's so that they can continue to produce those drugs.
As long as manufacturers are permitted to sell their drugs for
treatment purposes, they will have a greater incentive to produce
them and make them available for treatment use, despite the high
cost. The end result is that patients and their physicians benefit as
much as the drug manufacturer from the sale of investigational
drugs.
3. Criticism of the 1987 Regulations.-Although the regula-
tions speed the drug approval process and include safeguards to pro-
tect the integrity of the approval process, neither the proponents of
quicker approval nor the proponents of the status quo are satisfied.
For example, Martin Robinson, of the Lavender Hill Mob Gay and
Lesbian Association, doesn't think the regulations go far enough,
and criticizes them as tokenism and public relations." 7 On the other
hand, experts in the medical field question the propriety of using
drugs not proved to be safe and effective. Dr. Martin S. Hirsch of
the Infectious Disease Unit at Massachusetts General Hospital and
Harvard Medical School, believes that the release of compassionate
IND's will delay the licensure of safe and effective drugs: "Under
the rubric of compassion, we would only create false hopes and delay
[the] accumulation of accurate knowledge that would save lives."' 8
Echoing this sentiment, Dr. Itzhak Brook of the FDA's Anti-Infec-
tive Drugs Advisory Committee argues that if drugs are available,
patients will not participate in double-blind tests and that future
AIDS patients will suffer as a result." 9 Further, the National Insti-
tute of Health has expressed concern that an unacceptably high risk-
benefit ratio could result if proof of efficacy were no longer required,
and that allowing the sale of investigational new drugs could be a
disincentive for sponsors to obtain market approval. 2 '
During the hearings on the reproposal, Richard M. Cooper,
Chief Counsel to the FDA from 1977-1979, suggested a solution to
116. A Flawed Drug System, supra note 2, at 4, col. 1.
117. FDA Proposals, supra note 87, at 132 (statement of Martin Robinson).
118. Id. at 55 (statement of Martin S. Hirsch).
119. Id. at 61 (statement of Itzhak Brook).
120. Id. at 27, 29.
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the problem of proof of efficacy.121 Instead of requiring proof of effi-
cacy, the FDA could require a rational basis for believing the drug is
effective. The final regulations adopted this approach and provided a
standard of medical and scientific rationality. 2
Other suggestions to hasten, yet protect, the drug testing pro-
cess include replacing the double-blind tests, which are arguably un-
ethical, with historical control studies.2 3 Additionally, safeguards
within the 1987 regulations are designed to prevent abuse of the reg-
ulations by drug manufacturers.
In spite of the criticism of the manner in which the 1987 regula-
tions speed the new drug approval process, the FDA apparently de-
cided that the regulations did not speed the process enough. In Octo-
ber of 1988, the FDA promulgated additional regulations to
supplement the 1987 regulations.
B. The Interim Rule of 1988
Encouraged by its success with the expedited approval of
zidovudine, the FDA modeled the 1988 regulations after the proce-
dure used to approve zidovudine. 2 4 An important element of the
new regulations is the high level of FDA involvement in the approval
process. More important, however, is the early consultation feature,
which brings new drug sponsors and FDA officials together early in
the drug approval process and could make Phase III obsolete.12 5
Several other modifications of the 1987 regulations are included
in the 1988 regulations. For instance, while the 1987 regulations ad-
dressed "life-threatening" and "serious" illnesses, the new regula-
tions have replaced "serious" illnesses with "severely debilitating"
diseases." 6 In addition, the definitions of "life-threatening" illness
and "severely debilitating" diseases have been changed in order to
include a wider variety of illnesses.
Although the 1988 regulations purport to provide greater flexi-
bility in statutory interpretation, which creates greater availability of
new drugs to a wider variety of people, limitations still are imposed.
Only life-threatening and severely debilitating diseases are covered
by the regulations, and availability of investigational new drugs for
121. Id. at 7.
122. 1987 Regulations, supra note 3, at 19,468.
123. AIDS Drug Development and Related Issues: Hearing before a Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1986).
124. 1988 Regulations, supra note 3, at 41,517.
125. Id. at 41,519.
126. Id. at 41,516.
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severely debilitating diseases is limited to treatment of morbidity. 12 7
Even with these limitations, the new regulations are a positive step
forward in facilitating access to new drugs for seriously ill patients.
The following discussion highlights the features of the 1988
regulations.
1. Early Consultation.-Early consultation between new drug
sponsors and FDA officials appears to be the key factor in expediting
the drug approval process. Although the 1987 regulations provided
for early consultation in the form of a post-Phase II conference, the
interim rule has instituted a procedure in which the sponsor of the
IND and FDA may meet as early as the period before the submis-
sion of the IND.'28 At this meeting, the officials and the sponsor may
decide upon the most effective method of animal and early human
testing, and may formulate the best method of presenting that data
in the IND application.129 After the Phase I testing has been com-
pleted, a further "End-of-Phase-I" meeting may be scheduled at the
request of the sponsor in order to choose the format for Phase II that
is most suitable for providing adequate data on the safety and effi-
cacy of the particular drug.
130
The result of this well-controlled procession from animal testing
through Phase II should be that safety and efficacy will be proven
sufficiently by the end of Phase II, obviating the need for Phase
111J .11 When drugs for life-threatening diseases such as AIDS and
cancer are involved, mere evidence of safety and efficacy is generally
considered sufficient. For example, because the studies for
zidovudine were well-controlled, further premarketing studies were
not required.132  Likewise, the benefits of alpha interferons were
shown to outweigh the risks in Phase II testing so that the drug
could be licensed to treat hairy cell leukemia after Phase II was
complete. 33 However, in order to provide sufficient results, these
studies must include much larger Phase II tests than were previously
required."3 The more extensive testing in Phase II increases the like-
lihood that Phase III will be unnecessary.
127. Id. at 41,519. Morbidity refers to the disease itself, while symptomatic problems
are merely the physical manifestations of the disease, such as pain or fatigue.
128. Id. at 41,523.
129. 1988 Regulations, supra note 3, at 41,523.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 41,519.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 1988 Regulations, supra note 3, at 41,521.
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Early consultation has been very successful because sponsors do
not waste time on unnecessary testing. By collaborating on the most
effective method of testing, the sponsors and the FDA avoid the pit-
fall of poorly designed trials in which drugs are administered without
controls and unnecessary animal studies are completed. Further,
since the FDA is involved from the beginning of the process, the
review of the IND takes considerably less time.
Another change in the drug testing design abolished placebo-
controlled studies involving patients with life-threatening diseases
when an alternative effective therapy is available.135 Recognizing the
ethical dilemma of withholding therapeutic drugs from dying pa-
tients in order to test the new drug, the FDA no longer requires the
administration of placebos when an effective drug is available. 3 6 In-
stead, the FDA suggests studies comparing patients receiving a
known drug with those receiving the new drug alone or the known
drug in combination with the new drug. 3 However, when no effec-
tive alternative therapy is available, placebo testing is permissible.
138
Consistent with the 1987 regulations, treatment IND's are
available. No changes have been made to that program.
2. Risk-Benefit Analysis.-The interim rule provides for a
"medical risk-benefit judgment in making the final decision on ap-
provability."' 39 In balancing the risks and the benefits, the FDA will
weigh the benefits of the drug, the severity of the disease, and the
absence of a satisfactory alternative therapy against the known risks
and remaining questions about the drug.'40 Certainly those patients
who are terminally ill have little to lose by trying a new drug when
no alternative exists, except when the drug might worsen their
condition.
Another part of the interim rule permits the FDA to enlist the
aid of outside -expert scientific consultants or advisory committees in
deciding whether to approve the new drug. 4' By seeking the advice
of experts, the FDA is attempting to ensure that only safe and effec-
tive drugs are ultimately approved for marketing. In addition, the
FDA requires replication of key studies, which may be concurrent as
long as they are independent, in order to determine the reliability of
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the studies. " 2
3. Phase IV Studies.-The new regulations permit the FDA
to require the sponsor to engage in postmarketing surveillance "to
delineate additional information about the drug's risks, benefits, and
optimal use." " a By instituting postmarketing surveillance, the FDA
is taking into consideration the constructive criticism that it received
during the Congressional oversight hearings through the 1970s and
early 1980s. Utilizing this procedure expedites the drug approval
process, and at the same time, assures safety and effectiveness.
4. Other Elements of the Program.-The 1988 interim rule
provides for focused regulatory research on the phases of drug devel-
opment and evaluation."' Also, FDA officials are required to ac-
tively monitor clinical trials.
V. Conclusion
Since the passage of the Kefauver-Harris amendments in 1962,
critics of the new drug approval process have denounced it as unnec-
essary and expensive protection against the danger of inefficacious
drugs. " 5 After many years of research into the drug lag that pre-
vents seriously ill patients from receiving therapeutic drugs for seven
to thirteen years after their discovery, the FDA has recognized the
urgency of drug approval for the treatment of life-threatening and
severely debilitating diseases. Although critics denounce the new
procedures, the FDA has taken a courageous step in discharging its
duty to protect the health of the public. Approving an expedited
drug approval process is courageous; even with safeguards, the risks
attendant to new drugs may manifest themselves through adverse
side effects in any number of patients. The FDA recognizes, how-
ever, that "physicians and patients are generally [more] willing to
accept greater risks or side effects from products that treat life-
threatening or severely debilitating illnesses, than they would [be to]
accept [such risks] from products that treat less serious diseases."" 6
Considering the alternatives (death or severe disability), these pa-
tients should be permitted to choose a therapeutic drug even though
142. Id. at 41,521.
143. Id. at 41,524.
144. 1988 Regulations, supra note 3, at 41,524.
145. MacAvoy, FDA Regulation-At What Price?, L.A. Daily J., Nov. 24, 1982, at 4,
col. 6.
146. 1988 Regulations, supra note 3, at 41,516.
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it might cause adverse side effects. The loss of a few lives, as
weighed against the chance of saving thousands of lives, tips the
cost-benefit scale in favor of allowing the new drug.
The future of these facilitated procedures is uncertain. Never-
theless, the alarming spread of the AIDS disease and the elusiveness
of any cure for cancer ensures that these procedures will most likely
remain effective. Since the new regulations are not applicable to dis-
eases for which there are satisfactory alternative drugs, the general
public is not at risk. The safeguards provided by the new regulations
should significantly reduce the risks confronted by seriously ill
patients.
Considering the narrow scope of the facilitated procedures and
the safeguards they provide, it is unlikely that another drug failure
catastrophe will occur. In the event that such a disaster does occur,
however, the many lives saved versus the few lives lost or persons
disabled justifies the use of the expedited procedures. Although the
FDA would surely be criticized severely, it has accepted that risk in
order to aid those in serious need of aid. The regulations of 1987 and
1988 represent an impressive effort by the FDA to meet the de-
mands of the seriously ill public without compromising safety. The
success of the regulations is promising.
Lisa C. Will

